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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
A complaint was signed in the City 
court of Ogden, Utah on October 24, 1966, 
charging Robert Lee Dixon with grand lar-
ceny in violation of Utah Code 76-38-4. 
The matter was tried before the Honorable 
Charles G. Cowley, Judge of the Second 
Judicial District in and for Weber County, 
State of Utah. It was the defendant's 
contention that the monetary evidence as 
presented was without proper foundation 
and was insufficient to support an instruc-
t ion of grand larceny which was submitted 
to the jury. A motion for dismissal was 
denied by the trial judge. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty by the jury 
of the crime of grand larceny. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of 
the conviction and dismissal of the case 
against him. He seeks, in the alterna-
tive, an order for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 22, 1966, the defendant 
was a patron of the Skaggs Drug Center in 
Ogden, Utah. At approximately 6:40 p.m. 
the assistant store manager, Mr. Thomas 
Woodside, claimed that he saw the defend-
ant extract an undetermined number of bills 
from one of the store's cash registers 
after the salesgirl's attention had been 
diverted. (R.19) After requesting the 
assistance of several store employees, 
Mr. Woodside approached the defendant to 
demand an explanation. (R.39) The def-
endant took flight, but was immediately 
apprehended in a vacant lot behind the 
store. (R.33) Prior to giving chase, 
-- -3-
Woodside instructed salesgirl Carol Bunnell 
lo seal off the cash register from further 
use. (R.39) The defendant was taken to a 
storage room and detained there until police 
arrived. A search of the defendant by police 
officers disclosed that he had only $5.03 in 
his possession. (R.60) Store employees using 
flashlights began an immediate search of the 
vacant lot and the course of travel which the 
defendant had taken (R.46-7) and, although 
the defendant never left the sight of his 
pursuers and was never further than 25 to 30 
feet from them during his flight, a two-hour 
search was unsuccessful. (R. 75) Several 
employees began searching again at 7:00 a.m. 
the following morning (R.77) and some twenty 
doJl~r bills were found approximately four 
hours later. (R.54) A register check made 
the evening of the alleged theft revealed a 
5hortage of be~ween $250.00 and $270.00 (R.26 
and 39), that figure being revised to $204.99 
two days later. (R.82) Asst. Manager Richardsor 
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plac~a the amount recovered in the vacant lot 
at $180.00, but two days later the amount was 
revised to $200.00, being the sum receipted 
by the police. (R. 78) Mr. Richardson testi-
fied that upon finding the money he placed 
it in the company safe, connected with a 
paper clip and situated inside a pharmacy 
sack. (R.78) At the trial he could not 
identify Exhibit "A" as being the ten $20.00 
bills he found. The record conflicts as to 
whether it was Assistant Manager Woodside or 
Assistant Manager Richardson who took the 
money from the safe and gave custody of it 
to the Ogden police, however, at that time 
the money was loose, necessitating the officer 
to request a sack. (R.93 and 94) Appellant's 
counsel objected to the receipt of Exhibit "A" 
on the grounds of lack of a proper foundation 
for the offered evidence and asked for a dis-
missal of the :charge of grand larceny based 
on insufficient evidence, which motions were 
denied. 
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POINT I 
THE CURRENCY SUBMITTED INTO EVIDENCE BY 
'I'HE STATE WAS WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION AND 
SHODLD HAVE BEEN RULED AS INADMISSIBLE EVID-
ENCE, ELIMINATING THE INFERENCE OF GRAND 
LARCENY RATHER THAN PETTIT LARCENY. 
The defendant was convicted of grand 
larceny after $200.00 in twenty-dollar denom-
inations was admitted into evidence by the 
trial court. These bills purportedly were the 
same bills found by Assistant Manager Richard-
son in a vacant lot the day following the 
alleged larceny. This court has on numerous 
occasions required proper control and trans-
portation of evidenciary material to insure 
proper identification. (See Utah Farm Bureau 
Insurance Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399; 315 P.2d 
277, 1957.) In 29 Am Jur 2d § 775 it states: 
"When objects, such as bullets, 
specimens or parts taken from a 
human body, are produced in court and 
used there as an exhibit or made the 
basis for the testimony or report of 
an expert or officer, the identity of 
the object produced with the object 
taken from the body must be proved. 
Proof of this identity involves show-
ing that the thing was taken from a 
particular body from which it was 
supposed to be taken, and that there-
after it was properly kept and, if 
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necessary, transported and delivered 
to the one who produced it at the 
trial or the expert who analyzed 
or examined it. (emphasis ours) 
Several apparent inconsistencies support 
tne argument that these bills should have 
been inadmissible as evidence. They are: 
1. Witness Richardson testified at one 
point that he placed the recovered money in 
the company safe. (R.78) At another point, 
Richardson (referring to individuals not 
disclosed in the transcript) said they took 
it (the money) upstairs and put it into the 
safe. If someone other than Richardson took 
custody of the money, the person's testimony 
would be necessary for the bills to be admis-
sible into evidence. In Clayton v. Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co., 96 Utah 331; 85 P.2d 819 
(1938), the respondent sued his insurance 
co~pany for premiums allegedly due from an 
accident policy he had purchased from the 
~offipany. The policy provided coverage for 
~ll physical injuries, but specifically ex-
c~uded injury or disability caused by disease o: 
infection. The respondent's lawn mower had 
... 
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sLruck him in the stomach during a fall, 
inju.cing his appendix which were later re-
moved. The insurance company attempted to 
introduce a hospital record into evidence 
showing the appendix to be in a diseased 
condition; a pathologist's testimony con-
firmed the diseased condition of the appendix, 
but he admitted that the appendix, wrapped in 
gauze and bearing the respondent's name, had 
been delivered by an undisclosed nurse. The 
Supreme Court in affirming the trial court 
said: 
"The district court thought the 
necessary identification should be made 
by the person who took the appendix from 
the surgeon and delivered it to the path-
clocist. Appellant declined to offer any 
further testimony to identify the appendix ... 
Appellant offered no explanation of why the 
nurse who took the appendix from the surgeon, 
wrapped and labeled it, and delivered it to 
the pathologist was not called as a witness. 
~:11ch a foundation based on necessity should 
have been laid before the hearsay was admis-
si0 le." (emphasis ours) 
By analogy, the testimony of the employee 
1fuo took custody of the bills from Mr. Rich-
ardson should have been given to lay the 
toundation for the admissibility of the bills 
into evidence . Furthermore, it should have 
-8-
:,,_,.:.c1~1 established where the bills came from 
that were turned over to the police officers. 
unO.cr the requirements of Utah Farm Bureau 
l~5ur~ncc Co., v. Chugg, supra, the chain of 
,_:0nt:col on proposed Exhibit 11 A11 should have 
0een esta.~lished with some certainty, to the 
p0int of showing nonavailability to the safe 
1.Jj 01:hers, sealing the funds in an envelope, 
or any other number of accepted methods of 
evidence preservation. 
2. Richardson testified that the bills 
whLch he iound, totaling $180.00, according 
~o ~is own count, were fastened with a paper 
clip and placed in a pharmacy bag. It was 
employee Woodside who got the bills for the 
Osd8n police, although the record is not 
clear as to where he got these bills. Further 
Woodside failed to disclose the condition of 
L:,1e bills that he turned over to police 
c)i~icers. The record does disclose that two 
day::; later: 
(a) The bills were not fastened with 
a paper clip, but were loose. 
(b) They were not in a pharmacy bag. 
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\c) The bills totaled $200.00. 
in State v. Hall, 105 Utah 151; 139 P.2d 
!~8 (1943), reversed on rehearing on other 
c rou.iuS, 195 Utah 162; 145 P. 2d 494 (1944), 
cefenddnt's employer had suffered separate 
t~12.f-cs of sparkplugs, a rare commodity due 
co wa~time requirements, on April 11 and May 
23, 1943. The defendant sold an entire case 
of sparkplugs to a third party for a consider-
~bly reduced price and was charged with the 
May 23 larceny. The Supreme Court, in revers-
ln0 the conviction of defendant Hall, held 
that: 
11 T~1e State must definitely identify 
the goods found in the defendant's 
Dossession as the goods which were 
c~arged to have been stolen before 
the jury may draw an inference of 
guilt based upon the proof of pos-
session by the defendant of such 
goods." (emphasis ours) 
(Dixon was not found in possession.) 
The Court, therefore, refused to permit 
u conviction for the May 23 larceny where the 
eviJence might have been goods from the April 
11 larceny. This Court said in State v. Laub, 
102 Utah 402; 131 P.2d 805 (1942) that: 
-- -10-
"'I'hc prosecution must show not only 
by a preponderance of evidence that 
a crime was committed, and that the 
alleged facts and circumstances are 
true, but they must also be such 
~~cts and circumstances as are in-
compa table, upon any reasonable 
hypothesis, with the innocence of 
the accused, and incapable of explana-
tion upon any reasonable hypothesis 
other than the defendant's guilt." 
3. The search and discovery of the bills 
1 
by Skaggs' personnel, together with their 
subsequent revision of both the amounts mis-
sing and the amount recovered, when weighed 
with their control over the evidence, raises 
serious legal questions concerning the valid-
ity of the evidence in question. Assistant 
Manager Woodside testified that the defendant 
never left his sight; was never farther than 
25 to 30 feet from him during his flight, and 
did not testify to any throwing movements 
which would imply discard of the money by 
defendant. (R.27 and 34) The path of travel 
selected by the defendant was, therefore, fully 
known to his pursuers. He was captured behind 
Skaggs Drug Center, three employees searched 
for two hours with flashlights and failed to 
discover any money, (R.47) and the following 
-11-
da:; c.i~1 und<::termined number of employees 
again searched this area purportedly re-
covcr ing some twenty dollar bills four hours 
"~ L~e case of People v. Johnson, 4 Mich. ' 
AP?· 205; 144 N.W.2d 647 (1966), the defend-
c,.,;t \;as seized by police officers in a vacant ' 
lot benind a business that had just been 
Durglarized. Tools belonging to the store 
~2re found nearby. The defendant's explana-
tion o~ his presence in the field was ex-
~~e~ely dubious but the court nonetheless 
£,;und tr,e evidence insufficient to convict 
him and reversed the trial court. In the 
instctnt case, the defendant was likewise 
apprehe~ded in a vacant lot behind a place 
allegedly looted. Unlike the Johnson case, 
witnesses saw every move made by the defend-
u~~ ~ixon. Even though Dixon never left the 
~1ght of his pursuers, it took several 
t::H<;_-Jloyees six hours to allegedly recover some 
~w~nty dollar bills in a small geographical 
area. rt is submitted that under the author-
-12-
1 ~! '>~= L.he Johnson case, the evidence was 
Ln~ufficient to convict Mr. Dixon. 
~- Skaggs Drug reported a deficiency 
·_.c. ;:;,~cween $250.00 and $270.00 the evening 
0~ che p~rported theft. That sum was later 
r~vised downward to $204.99. The amount 
a~~~ged:y recovered in the field was origin-
G ~~l re)orted to be $180.00 but was later 
L2Vised ~pw~rds to $200.00. These are sur-
pr .i s:;..1--,.g :;_y c..ccura te revisions when one con-
s 1sers ~na~ an adjacent register for the 
same ?eriod shows an unexplained deficiency 
0.C :,;J~J.00. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that 
--:"ere was an unsatisfactory chain of control 
over the evi6ence; the State failed to intro-
due, into the record all those who took 
possewsion of the evidence; and they failed 
t . ..; <.1_. ~-;close all those who may have had access 
to t,,e safe where the bills were purportedly 
i ci 1. cl • This Court has demanded control over 
1 "'~u,,..._'ial introduced into evidence. In the 
c~~e of Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 
--
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su2 rc., ~~c court refused to permit a blood 
·~·-,i :._:: doctor testified he could not 
_--~. ;::_,"-;)c;;r whether ne personally drew 
~: .c-:: sClrnp~e, that usually the labora-
-0 cy ~ec~nician draws the blood. 
J.2:::_c~-"er could he remember to whom 
c:-.e: .:,pecir:,en was given after it was 
~r~w~ ... nor was there evidence that 
~d~' ._;~:;ecimen was labeled or sealed 
'---':~ :::_:{ so by whom before it was 
:ur~e:d over to the laboratory. 
C~c~r~y there is a lack of necessary 
2vidence linking the sample analyzed 
'.::::_ cJ.1 "che blood sample drawn f ram 
~(',.·.J.gc; • • • II 
~~c ~ills delivered to police officers 
... -,o-c ~.-,::_.--ch the description of the bills 
"-o ~.-:c. 0 J l'•::c. Richardson. While the bills 
Iound in the field may have been placed in a 
~~~2. wrapped a~d sealed by one employee, the 
nill~ t~rned over to officers by another 
e~?~oye0 were not sealed, were not wrapped, 
~~J were taken from an undisclosed source. 
~ ~e: 0ills were even of a different amount, 
10 ~~lv similarity being that they were of 
',·1is Court, since State v. Hall, supra, 
,-,, '-' .-e:J:used to affirm convictions where the 
material introduced into evidence cannot or 
--
-14-
,., J ,,.Jc. :)2ce::(1 identified to Jche crime. Since 
,~f·'-" ,,,,-,:;,u.-.t allegedly taken by Dixon is an 
,•c .::_._,c,,,.._:c_:_ to hc..ve failed even by inferance 
~~0~~r~y ~rove all elements of the offense. 
l~, ~~2~2fore, su0illitted that the convic-
~::_0.--. :-.,-.--.o_-,:._c.. 'De reversed and the case against 
::.-:: c_:_2fer;c1.:.:...-,t dismissed or ordered retried 
:; .. ,:,.112 ~ ;J.c :..uded offense of pet tit larceny. 
-- CulJ.~'l' E;.:<.::li:D J:~\ FAILING TO PROHIBIT 
~ ,_-.·:._·...:_;' S AT':'ORN:i'.:Y FROM ARGUING FLIGHT BY 
-- .:::_wi=-.~\·;· =~\ nIS CLOSING ARGUMENT I WHICH 
.i__::c~C,~ :-:.=-.5 P;{:CJUDICIAL. 
?r~or to closing arguments, and after 
- - - - ,- r-
1- lj l1...i.... I,_. ....... c..u instructed the jury, appellant's 
\.:0c._-,.:.,;:-~:._ rc.::~'-·ested, out of presence of the jury, 
~~~sio~ from the court to the State's 
·· -~0 • prohibitil;g him from arguing the 
··" --·-=c"-::"" oi_ flight by defendant at the time 
~, G~ ~~?roached by store employees. This 
out of the hearing of the court 
i. "- i..Jl_1 .... LI..:) .C as is evidenced in the transcript 
-15-
j_\)\). The Court denied this request 
State's Attorney to argue 
- .I.,_' ~~ i~fe::cnces on the basis that appel-
~:1~ · •; c~.::;Jnsel JI ••• had not requested such 
-~s~::uc~~on and (since) there was evidence 
\- .. ~- :E~~s~-..t it could be discussed in the argu-
., ~, ,.., _,_ I I 
,,ti-=.. .... t_ • 
.. ;i-;:->ellat1t. aG.mi ts that he did not tender 
c.d i,-,s'~::L..c'cl.on ot1 flight and the inference 
L" c c: jc.::'! ri'light draw from same, but 
-~2c:.c,:l.~.:., ·c>.c.c t~'lese i~1ferences, if any, would 
c·r•., .J.c.v2 ·'::iee~" detrimental to appellant's 
"--"'"" ::ieneficial to the State, who like-
1J.LSe G.l.G. ;-10t instruct with such instructions. 
:t wo~ld a~near that the law of the 
~ ... 
::;cc,~-::2 o::: C:::c:..~-, is clear on what counsel may 
~~g~c ~o the Jury as in State v. Hanna, 81 
~Jtc:,:--, 503; 21 ?.2d 537 (1933), this Court 
··~~c ju~y must receive the law from 
=~2 cac.::t and counsel's arguments in 
u0 :;~:.,2ct to the law must be within the 
)~ ::...:c i~::i::'..es given by the court in its 
~·-,~·cructions. JI 
.~~~ ~~bo People v. Fields, 277 NY2d, 1967.) 
-lG-
~~~ C jurt erred in permitting a State's 
.-. .:. co.:i,-::..:-/ ~o u.rgue a theory of implied guilt, 
', .. , .:· . .:...lc.~-:oc.c;:1 a valid legal theory if sup-
.~~~2c ~i the evidence and the instructions 
c.u ... ~2 = c.ry, was not a legal theory which the 
·: cm1~c.::. consider in passing upon the guilt 
.,~ ::_ .·"1oc2,-:.ce of the defendant without being 
so ins~ruc~ed and was, therefore, prejudicial. 
CO:l'JCLUS :!:ON 
L· .• ~)~J2=..la.r1t. requests this Court to find 
c.: z:.. .:·~~ .-·ce:c of law that no credible evidence 
E~"~tc~ warranting submission of this case 
guilt or innocence of the 
--:r:c • .-,2 o:f .:;;rand larceny and requests this Court 
tc v~ca~e the jury's verdict of guilty, 
r2~~~~~~g the case to the lower court with 
~-,.-u::~in°;.s, either finding that Exhibit 11 A11 
-" or ordering the grand 
rse be dismissed, based on the lack 
v~~~nce ~efore the court, and if the def-
~c is retried, it be on the issue of pettit 
Appellant further requests a 
-17-
;\·~:···"' 1 o:::: t"t1e jury verdict because of the 
-~ uaice of the Scate's Attorney's argument 
, _ _) - t_, _, 
~o c.-.:: 1 u ~'! 011 c.. legal theory not within the 
of the Court's instructions 
Respectfully submitted 
~~=.:.o. TCH & .McRAE 
At~orneys for Appellant 
707 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
